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USASETAF VICENZA ITALY

S E C R E T STATE 119250

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: XA, PREL, PINR  
SUBJECT: INR ASSESSMENTS

"ROME FOR COBURN AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR  
MCKINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, PARIS

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW

AUTHORITY: ROBERT R. STRAND

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FOR PERLOW, USNATO FOR HAMILTON, BONN FOR KLEMP,  
USCINCEUR AND HQ US CENTRAL COMMAND FOR POLADS, HQ  
USEUCOM FOR EC J-5, COMMANDER USASETAF FOR G-2"

1. SECTIONS ON LIBERIA AND ETHIOPIA ARE SECRET, LESOTHO  
AND CONGO ARE CONFIDENTIAL; WOMEN IN AFRICA AND RWANDA  
ARE LOU.

2. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS THE FOLLOWING RECENT INR  
ASSESSMENTS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT, AS  
APPROPRIATE.

3. INR CAN NOW RECEIVE CLASSIFIED "E MAIL." THE  
ADDRESS TO BE USED IS INR/AA. IF A NAME IS USED AS AN  
ADDRESSEE, THE MESSAGE WILL NOT BE RECEIVED. A NAME,  
HOWEVER, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE FIRST LINE OF THE  
MESSAGE.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS:

LIBERIA: PEACE PROCESS GASPING; 4/25

WOMEN IN AFRICA: PRESSING FOR GENDER EQUALITY; 4/22  
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ROOTS OF THE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA; 4/29

VIEWPOINTS:

LESOTHO: COUP IN THE OFFING?; 4/25

ETHIOPIA: BIRTHPAINS OF DEMOCRACY; 4/28

CONGO'S FRAGILE PEACE; 4/29

BEGIN TEXT

LIBERIA: PEACE PROCESS GASPING

4. SERIOUS FIGHTING AMONG LIBERIAN FACTIONS, THEIR  
UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH DISARMAMENT, AND  
CONTINUING POLITICAL DISPUTES HAVE BROUGHT THE PEACE  
PROCESS TO A VIRTUAL HALT.

5. INAUGURATION OF THE LIBERATION NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL  
GOVERNMENT (LNTG) IN MARCH, THE SEATING OF THE  
TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATURE AND CONFIRMATION OF SOME  
CABINET MINISTERS, AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF DISARMAMENT  
BY ALL ARMED FACTIONS HAD ENCOURAGED HOPES THE PEACE  
PROCESS COULD END THE CIVIL WAR AND SET LIBERIA ON THE

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ROAD TO POLITICAL NORMALIZATION. [REDACTED]

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6. FIGHTING PERSISTS. ARMED HOSTILITIES AMONG THE  
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FACTIONS CONTINUES IN SOUTHEASTERN LIBERIA AND IN LOFA  
COUNTY IN THE NORTHWEST. [REDACTED]

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7. IN THE NORTHWEST THERE HAVE BEEN PERIODIC CLASHES  
BETWEEN THE NPFL AND THE LOFA DEFENSE FORCE ON ONE SIDE,  
AND ULIMO ON THE OTHER. FIGHTING BETWEEN KRAHN AND  
MANDINGO COMPONENTS OF ULIMO PERSISTS, DESPITE THE APRIL  
1 AGREEMENT. THE FIGHTING, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTHEAST,  
HAS PRODUCED LARGE REFUGEE FLOWS.

8. CONFLICT MENTALITY. [REDACTED]

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WOMEN IN AFRICA: PRESSING FOR GENDER EQUALITY

11. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IS COMMON IN AFRICA, AS ELSEWHERE, SLOWING THE PACE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. AFRICAN WOMEN ARE BEGINNING TO DEMAND GREATER RECOGNITION FOR THEIR ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIETY, AND WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS IN A FEW COUNTRIES ARE GAINING POLITICAL CLOUT. TRADITIONAL AFRICAN CULTURAL BIASES, HOWEVER, REINFORCED BY COLONIAL LEGACIES AND POSTINDEPENDENCE POLICIES, WILL CONTINUE FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL GENERATIONS TO BOLSTER SOCIAL PRESSURES AGAINST EFFORTS BY WOMEN TO ORGANIZE AND DEMAND EQUALITY.

12. CULTURALLY ENTRENCHED BIAS. PART OF AFRICA'S COMPLEX PATTERN OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION CAN BE TRACED TO TRADITIONAL MORES. IN THE MORE THAN 2,000 INDIGENOUS

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CULTURES ON THE CONTINENT, WOMEN'S ROLES GENERALLY HAVE BEEN SUBORDINATE TO THOSE OF MEN. MALE-CENTERED KINSHIP GROUPS USUALLY FORM THE CORE OF AFRICAN SOCIETIES. WOMEN'S ROLES--ALTHOUGH HIGHLY VALUED--HAVE DEPENDED ON WOMEN'S ABILITY TO PERPETUATE AND MAINTAIN THESE PATRILINEAGES. EVEN IN THE ROUGHLY ONE-FIFTH OF ALL AFRICAN SOCIETIES WHERE KINSHIP IS TRACED THROUGH FEMALE FOREBEARS, MEN LARGELY HAVE HELD THE FORMAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS AND ULTIMATE CONTROL OVER ECONOMIC RESOURCES.

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13. THE MAJORITY OF WOMEN IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SOCIETIES HAVE BEEN REMINDED DAILY OF THEIR SUBORDINATION TO MEN, ALTHOUGH AMBITIOUS WOMEN SOMETIMES HAVE LEARNED TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE WITHOUT ANY OF THE FORMAL TRAPPINGS OF POWER, SUCH AS CEREMONIAL TITLES OR POLITICAL OFFICE. EVEN TODAY, TRADITIONAL PRACTICES THAT REINFORCE WOMEN'S SUBSERVIENCE TO MEN PERSIST IN MANY--ESPECIALLY RURAL--AREAS OF AFRICA. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WIDESPREAD PRACTICE OF PAYING "BRIDEPRICE," OR WEALTH TRANSFERRED FROM THE GROOM'S FAMILY TO THAT OF HIS NEW WIFE, IS SAID BY MANY TO COMPENSATE HER FAMILY FOR THEIR "LOSS," BUT IT ALSO SYMBOLIZES THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN AS WARDS OF MEN. FEMALE CIRCUMCISION, WHICH IS STILL PRACTICED IN MUCH OF AFRICA, IS ACCEPTED--EVEN BY WOMEN--AS A DEMONSTRATION OF RESPECT FOR TRADITION AND OBEDIENCE TO SOCIAL DICTATES. THE WIDESPREAD PRACTICE OF POLYGAMY ALSO REINFORCES THE TRADITIONAL BELIEF THAT WOMEN ARE LESS IMPORTANT THAN MEN.

14. THE COLONIAL ERA ENTRENCHED MALE DOMINANCE IN MUCH OF AFRICA. COLONIAL OFFICIALS, WHO BROUGHT WITH THEM  
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STRONG EUROPEAN GENDER BIASES, APPOINTED MEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AS THEIR ADMINISTRATORS AND ASSISTANTS. COLONIAL POLICIES ALSO ERODED THE PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY OF THE FEW WOMEN WHO HAD ACHIEVED RECOGNITION IN THEIR SOCIETY. EUROPEAN OFFICIALS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN DEALING WITH TRADITIONAL KINGDOMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, GHANA. AND UGANDA, OFTEN IGNORED THE POWER OF THE QUEEN MOTHER, WHO HAD HER OWN COUNCIL OF ADVISERS AND COULD INFLUENCE POPULAR OPINION AGAINST THE KING. EUROPEAN MISSIONARIES, DESPITE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO MODERNIZING EDUCATION AND HEALTH CARE, WEAKENED RESPECT FOR FEMALE RELIGIOUS "SPECIALISTS," WHO SERVED AS MEDIATORS BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL AND PHYSICAL WORLDS.

15. MOST AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS, SINCE THEIR INDEPENDENCE IN THE LATE 1950S AND 1960S, HAVE HELPED ENTRENCH STATE-SPONSORED MALE DOMINANCE. POLICYMAKERS SOMETIMES DISCRIMINATE OPENLY, BUT MORE OFTEN, MALE POLITICIANS SIMPLY FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF THEIR DECISIONS ON THE LIVES OF WOMEN. WOMEN HAVE RARELY BEEN EXPLICITLY DENIED THE RIGHT TO VOTE, BUT THEY OFTEN ARE

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RIDICULED IF THEY DEMONSTRATE AN INTEREST IN POLITICS. A FEW HEADS OF STATE, SUCH AS GUINEA'S SEKOU TOURE IN THE 1960S AND UGANDA'S CURRENT PRESIDENT MUSEVENI, HAVE MADE A POINT OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN IMPORTANT ADVISORY ROLES IN THE POLITICAL HIERARCHY.

16. LEGAL INFERIORITY. ONLY A FEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GUARANTEEING GENDER EQUALITY, AND EVEN WHERE SUCH PROVISIONS EXIST, THEY FREQUENTLY ARE UNENFORCED. IN BENIN, BURUNDI, CHAD,  
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MOZAMBIQUE, AND NAMIBIA, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST GENDER DISCRIMINATION IS ROUTINELY IGNORED IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS. IN MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, "TRADITIONAL" AND "MODERN" LEGAL SYSTEMS EXIST SIDE BY SIDE; DISPUTES INVOLVING "WOMEN'S ISSUES," OR FAMILY MATTERS, OFTEN ARE REFERRED TO TRADITIONAL COURTS OR ADJUDICATORS. IN UGANDA, FOR EXAMPLE, MANY WOMEN ARE PRESSURED TO SETTLE DISPUTES THROUGH TRADITIONAL CHANNELS, AND OFFICIALS SOMETIMES BALK AT A WOMAN'S EFFORTS TO PRESS CHARGES THROUGH THE MODERN COURT SYSTEM.

17. LEGALLY ENTRENCHED MALE DOMINANCE IS A SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO WOMEN'S ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT IN MANY COUNTRIES. IN SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS SEVERAL STATES OF NIGERIA, A WOMAN HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO OWN OR BEQUEATH PROPERTY WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF HER HUSBAND OR A MALE RELATIVE. WOMEN ARE ROUTINELY DENIED COMPENSATION IN CASES OF DIVORCE, AND THEY OFTEN LOSE CUSTODY OF THEIR CHILDREN IF TRADITION DECREES THAT CHILDREN ARE THE WARDS OF THEIR FATHERS. SOME AFRICAN WOMEN LACK THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ENTER INTO A FORMAL CONTRACT WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF A MALE RELATIVE. BANKING OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT AFRICA REJECT WOMEN'S APPLICATIONS FOR CREDIT FAR MORE OFTEN THAN MEN'S, ACCORDING TO ECONOMIC RESEARCH STUDIES. MOREOVER WOMEN ARE OFTEN THREATENED WITH OSTRACISM BY THEIR FAMILY OR VILLAGE IF THEY CONSIDER EXERCISING LEGAL RIGHTS TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ENTITLED.

18. A COROLLARY OF THE LEGAL INFERIORITY OF WOMEN IS  
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THAT CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN OFTEN ARE NOT PROSECUTED FULLY  
OR ARE NOT CONSIDERED CRIMINAL OFFENSES. VIOLENCE  
AGAINST WOMEN, ALTHOUGH UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNED IN THE  
ABSTRACT, OFTEN IS EXCUSED, RATIONALIZED, OR OVERLOOKED  
BY BOTH TRADITIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS. FEMALE  
CIRCUMCISION, UNTIL RECENTLY, HAS BEEN AVOIDED AS A  
TOPIC OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND MANY LEADERS HAVE REFUSED  
TO CONSIDER IT A WOMEN'S RIGHTS ISSUE.

19. CRITICAL BUT UNRECOGNIZED LABOR. THE LEGAL  
DEFINITION OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN AS INFERIOR TO THAT OF  
MEN BELIES THE IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO  
THE FAMILY AND COMMUNITY. AFRICAN WOMEN BALANCE DEMANDS  
FOR THEIR TIME AND LABOR--IN CHILD CARE, HOUSEHOLD  
MANAGEMENT, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, AND MARKETING.

20. IN AGRICULTURE--THE MAINSTAY OF MOST AFRICAN  
ECONOMIES AND THE SECTOR MOST OFTEN TARGETED FOR  
DEVELOPMENT AND REDUCING POVERTY--WOMEN ACCOUNT FOR  
ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF TOTAL LABOR EXPENDED AND PRODUCE  
MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE FOOD CONSUMED IN AFRICA,  
ACCORDING TO WORLD BANK AND UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM  
ESTIMATES. OBSERVATIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL WORLDWATCH  
INSTITUTE SUGGEST THAT WOMEN IN RWANDA WORK THREE TIMES  
AS MANY HOURS AS MEN IN AGRICULTURAL AND DOMESTIC  
PURSUITS.

21. MUCH WORK DONE BY WOMEN, INCLUDING ECONOMIC  
PRODUCTION OUTSIDE THE HOME, IS EXCLUDED FROM OFFICIAL  
ACCOUNTS, REGARDLESS OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE FAMILY OR  
COMMUNITY. ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COOKING, CLEANING, AND

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CHILDCARE ARE INCLUDED IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC STATISTICS  
ONLY IF THE WORKER IS PAID A WAGE, SO MOST WOMEN'S  
DOMESTIC LABOR IS OFFICIALLY "UNPRODUCTIVE." MUCH  
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF CROPS BY WOMEN IS RELEGATED  
TO THE "INFORMAL ECONOMY"--WHICH INCLUDES UNREGULATED  
MARKETS, BARTER TRADE, AND UNWRITTEN CONTRACTS--AND IS  
EXCLUDED FROM MEASUREMENTS OF PRODUCTIVITY.

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22. INVISIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS. THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN AFRICA, ALTHOUGH UNRECORDED AND SOMETIMES UNRECOGNIZED, IS VITAL TO HOUSEHOLD SURVIVAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ACCOUNTS FOR 30-50 PERCENT OF GDP IN SOME COUNTRIES, ACCORDING TO ACADEMIC EXPERTS CITED BY THE WORLD BANK. RESEARCH STUDIES IN ZIMBABWE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE SHOWN THAT WOMEN'S "PETTY TRADE" ACCOUNTS FOR 40-100 PERCENT OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOMES. WOMEN TRADERS IN WEST AFRICA WIELD ENORMOUS ECONOMIC POWER AND SOMETIMES USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO PRESSURE MALE POLITICIANS TO RESPOND TO THEIR NEEDS, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF THEIR ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION FROM GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL RECORDS.

23. THE IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN'S UNRECORDED LABOR IN AFRICA SUGGESTS THAT MAKING WOMEN'S WORK MORE "VISIBLE" WOULD HELP ADJUST GOVERNMENT POLICIES TO ECONOMIC REALITY. ONE STEP TOWARD BRINGING WOMEN'S WORK INTO FULL VIEW HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE WOMEN WHO ARE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD TO CLAIM THAT STATUS IN GOVERNMENT CENSUSES AND OFFICIAL QUESTIONNAIRES. IN SOME AREAS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND LESOTHO, FOR EXAMPLE, WOMEN ARE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AS HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN 40 PERCENT OF ALL

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DWELLINGS, INCLUDING HOUSEHOLDS WHERE MALE FAMILY MEMBERS WORK IN DISTANT MINES OR CITIES. WITH MORE ACCURATE OFFICIAL RECORDS, WOMEN SOMETIMES ARE ABLE TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL OR AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE THEY OTHERWISE MIGHT BE DENIED.

24. UNEQUAL REWARDS. DESPITE THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIETY, WOMEN ARE SYSTEMATICALLY DISADVANTAGED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO SUCCEED. UN AND WORLD BANK ESTIMATES SUGGEST THAT WOMEN IN AFRICA HAVE RECEIVED LITTLE MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THE FORMAL EDUCATION ATTAINED BY MEN. MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ILLITERATE ADULTS IN AFRICA ARE WOMEN. WOMEN WHO ENTER THE FORMAL, WAGE-PAYING ECONOMY ENCOUNTER STRONG SEXIST BIASES, INCLUDING FREQUENT HARASSMENT BY MALE COWORKERS AND SUPERIORS. LOW-WAGE JOBS FREQUENTLY ARE SET ASIDE FOR WOMEN. WOMEN ALSO EARN MUCH LESS THAN MEN, EVEN IN COMPARABLE JOBS. ACROSS THE CONTINENT, WOMEN EARN ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF ALL WAGES PAID AND



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OWN LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF THE LAND, ACCORDING TO  
WORLD BANK ESTIMATES.

25. DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT  
PROGRAMS. BECAUSE THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF WOMEN  
OFTEN ARE OVERLOOKED, MANY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS'  
RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC CRISES THROUGH STRUCTURAL  
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS (SAPS) FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT  
THEIR LIKELY EFFECT ON WOMEN. MAJOR FEATURES OF  
SAPS--REDUCED GOVERNMENT SPENDING, EXPANDED PRIVATE  
SECTOR ACTIVITY, AND INCREASED EMPHASIS ON MARKET  
FACTORS IN DETERMINING PRICES--HAVE A MORE SERIOUS

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ADVERSE EFFECT ON WOMEN THAN ON MEN. PUBLIC-SECTOR  
WAGES GENERALLY ARE REDUCED, AND WOMEN--WHO OCCUPY THE  
LOWER RUNGS OF THE WAGE SCALE--SUFFER THE MOST DRASTIC  
AGE CUTS. SUBSIDIES ON NECESSITIES, INCLUDING  
FOODSTUFFS, OFTEN ARE REDUCED, FORCING WOMEN TO SPEND  
MORE TIME AND ENERGY FOR NECESSITIES.

26. OTHER ASPECTS OF SAPS AFFECT WOMEN  
DISPROPORTIONATELY. GOVERNMENT SERVICES--SUCH AS  
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS--ON  
WHICH POOR WOMEN RELY, ARE CURTAILED. WHEN HEALTH CARE  
AND EDUCATIONAL COSTS RISE, FAMILIES FREQUENTLY CHOOSE  
TO REDUCE OPPORTUNITIES FOR GIRLS, RATHER THAN BOYS, AND  
THE CYCLE OF POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION IS REPEATED IN  
THE NEXT GENERATION. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT MEANS SHARP  
REDUCTIONS IN THE AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND BANKING  
SERVICES, WHERE WOMEN ALREADY ARE UNDERREPRESENTED.

27. WORLD BANK ECONOMISTS INSIST THAT REDUCTIONS IN  
SOCIAL SERVICES ARE NOT INTRINSIC TO SAPS, AND THEY CITE  
THE EXAMPLES OF BOTSWANA, MAURITIUS, AND THE GAMBIA IN  
THE LATE 1980S AS GOVERNMENTS THAT SHIFTED PRIORITIES IN  
SPENDING TO MAINTAIN VITAL HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL  
PROGRAMS WHILE THEY REDUCED PUBLIC SPENDING OVERALL.  
OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE PREFERRED TO RETAIN MORE HIGHLY  
VISIBLE URBAN SUBSIDIES AND EMPLOYMENT.

28. ADDRESSING GLOBAL ISSUES. TRADITIONAL WOMEN'S  
ISSUES--POPULATION CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL  
PRESERVATION, FOR EXAMPLE--ARE GAINING IMPORTANCE IN  
AFRICAN POLITICAL DEBATES AND NO LONGER CAN BE IGNORED

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BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR INTERNATIONAL DONORS.  
AFRICA'S POPULATION--NOW ABOUT 500 MILLION--COULD TRIPLE

BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF THE NEXT CENTURY, ACCORDING TO  
WORLD BANK ESTIMATES, WITH DEVASTATING ENVIRONMENTAL  
CONSEQUENCES. EXPERTS FROM MANY FIELDS AGREE THAT  
PROVIDING AMPLE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR GIRLS IS  
AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN POPULATION CONTROL. A 1992 WORLD  
BANK STUDY, "DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT," CONCLUDED  
THAT "IMPROVING EDUCATION FOR GIRLS MAY BE THE MOST  
IMPORTANT LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AFRICA."

29. GAINING POLITICAL CLOUT. WOMEN IN MANY AFRICAN  
COUNTRIES HAVE BEGUN ORGANIZING TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY, AND  
TO IMPROVE THEIR LIVES AND THAT OF THEIR CHILDREN. IN  
KENYA, FOR EXAMPLE, WOMEN ARE ORGANIZING TO PRESSURE  
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT--LARGELY MALE BUSINESS OWNERS--FOR  
LAWS THAT HELP ERODE PRACTICES THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST  
WOMEN. THESE WOMEN HAVE ORGANIZED A NATIONAL TASK FORCE  
TO PRESS FOR GENDER-NEUTRAL LEGISLATION. LIKE WOMEN'S  
ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS THE CONTINENT, THE KENYAN GROUP  
INTENDS TO MONITOR PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS AND  
LEGISLATION, MOBILIZE SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S CAUSES,  
INCREASE THE USE OF THE MEDIA TO ADDRESS WOMEN'S ISSUES,  
AND PRESSURE THE COURTS FOR FAIR TREATMENT OF WOMEN  
ESPECIALLY IN CASES OF DIVORCE.

30. AFRICAN WOMEN ARE ENTERING POLITICS IN RECORD  
NUMBERS, DESPITE STRONG INFORMAL PRESSURES AGAINST SUCH  
ACTIVITIES. BURUNDI'S SYLVIA KINIGI BECAME AFRICA'S  
FIRST WOMAN PRIME MINISTER IN JULY 1993. RWANDA'S

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AGATHE UWILINGIYIMANA WAS THE SECOND WOMAN PRIME  
MINISTER, BUT UWILINGIYIMANA WAS KILLED IN EARLY APRIL  
1994, IN THE ETHNIC SLAUGHTER THAT FOLLOWED THE DEATH  
OF  
PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA. WOMEN HOLD CABINET OR  
PARLIAMENTARY OFFICES IN TOGO, CAPE VERDE, NAMIBIA,

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ZAMBIA, ETHIOPIA, AND SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES. THERE ARE FOUR WOMEN CABINET MINISTERS IN ERITREA.

31. GAINING GLOBAL SUPPORT. THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECLARED 1975-85 THE "DECADE OF THE WOMAN," AND HELD THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF WORLDWIDE CONFERENCES ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN 1980. THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, WHICH WILL BE HELD IN BEIJING IN SEPTEMBER 1995, WILL FOCUS ON THE NEED FOR EDUCATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL EQUALITY, AND IMPROVED HEALTH CARE--INCLUDING THE PREVENTION OF THE SPREAD OF AIDS. THESE ISSUES ARE VITAL TO AFRICAN WOMEN'S EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF GENDER EQUALITY FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS.

32. CHALLENGES AHEAD. WOMEN IN AFRICA HAVE WIELDED THEIR GREATEST INFLUENCE OUTSIDE THE FORMAL POWER STRUCTURE--OFTEN THROUGH FAMILY TIES OR, IN RECENT DECADES, THE INFORMAL ECONOMY--BUT THIS POWER HAS NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS FOR WOMEN. NOR HAVE WOMEN BEEN ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE WEAKENING OF FORMAL POWER STRUCTURES THAT RESULTED FROM THE ECONOMIC FAILURES OF THE PAST DECADE.

33. DESPITE A FEW DRAMATIC SUCCESSES, WOMEN'S GROUPS IN AFRICA HAVE TAKEN ONLY MINIMAL STEPS TOWARD "WOMEN'S LIBERATION." URBAN-BASED WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS, WITH

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THEIR MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASS MEMBERSHIPS, HAVE ACHIEVED LITTLE IN RURAL AREAS. GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS IN RURAL VILLAGES ENCOUNTER STRONG CONSERVATIVE PRESSURES, FROM WOMEN AS WELL AS MEN, TO ADHERE TO TRADITIONAL PRACTICES THAT TREAT WOMEN AS INFERIOR. (R.BYRNES)

ROOTS OF THE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA

34. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DOMINATION OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI BY THE TUTSI ETHNIC GROUP--WHO HISTORICALLY COMPRISED 14 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN THE TWO COUNTRIES--APPEARS NOT TO HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED OR EFFECTIVELY CHALLENGED BY THE HUTU MAJORITY UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE IN 1962. THE TUTSI LOST CONTROL OF RWANDA TO THE HUTU MAJORITY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, BUT CONTINUED TO HOLD ALL POLITICAL AND MILITARY POWER IN BURUNDI UNTIL THE ELECTION LAST YEAR

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OF A HUTU GOVERNMENT. ETHNIC COMPETITION FOR STATE POWER IN BOTH STATES HAS STIMULATED SEVERAL SURGES OF INTENSE ETHNIC VIOLENCE SINCE 1959, BUT THERE IS NO COGENT THESIS TO EXPLAIN THE SHEER SAVAGERY THAT CHARACTERIZES THE ONGOING MASSACRES.

35. THE ETHNIC DIMENSION. TUTSI PASTORALISTS OVER 500 YEARS AGO SETTLED AMONG, AND CAME TO DOMINATE, HUTU AGRICULTURALISTS INHABITING THE REGION. BY THE TIME EUROPEANS ARRIVED IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY, RWANDA WAS A CENTRALIZED TUTSI-LED KINGDOM WHILE BURUNDI WAS A STATE OF LOOSELY LINKED PRINCIPALITIES LED BY A TUTSI SUB-CASTE. IN BOTH, HUTUS AND TUTSIS HAD COME TO SHARE A COMMON CULTURE AND LANGUAGE, AND ETHNICITY WAS OFTEN  
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SYNONYMOUS WITH CASTE. IN BOTH STATES, TUTSI CATTLE-OWNERS GENERALLY HAD MORE POWER AND WEALTH AND DOMINATED THEIR HUTU PEASANT CLIENTS. BUT INTERMARRIAGE SOMETIMES OCCURRED, AND A PROCESS EVEN EXISTED BY WHICH RICH HUTUS COULD BE RECOGNIZED AS TUTSIS. TUTSI RULE WAS MOST ACCEPTED WHERE IT WAS STRONGEST, IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL RWANDA AND IN MOST OF BURUNDI. THE RWANDAN TUTSI MONARCHY WAS MOST RESENTED IN NORTHERN RWANDA--WHERE ITS RULE WAS WEAKEST AND LOCAL PEOPLE DIVIDED THEMSELVES INTO CO-EQUAL FUNCTIONAL CASTES OF HUTU FARMERS AND TUTSI HERDERS.

36. COLONIAL EXPERIENCE. GERMANY, WHICH IN 1899 IMPOSED A JOINT PROTECTORATE OVER RWANDA AND BURUNDI, AND LATER BELGIUM REINFORCED TUTSI DOMINANCE--AND HUTU CONSCIOUSNESS OF THEIR SOCIAL INFERIORITY. TUTSIS, WHO WERE SEEN AS "SUPERIOR," WERE FAVORED WITH EDUCATIONAL AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES. ALL RWANDANS AND BURUNDIANS CARRIED IDENTITY CARDS STATING THEIR ETHNICITY, WHICH HEIGHTENED ETHNIC AWARENESS AND LIMITED SOCIAL MOBILITY.

37. RWANDA'S HUTU REVOLUTION. IN 1959, HUTU-TUTSI STRIFE IN RWANDA PROMPTED BELGIAN CONCESSIONS TO NASCENT PRO-HUTU POLITICAL PARTIES. HUTU VICTORIES IN LOCAL ELECTIONS AND ANTI-TUTSI VIOLENCE CAUSED THE KING TO FLEE INTO EXILE IN 1960. FROM 1959 TO 1964, 20,000 PEOPLE, MOSTLY TUTSIS, WERE KILLED AND OVER 150,000--PERHAPS 40 PERCENT OF RWANDAN TUTSIS--WENT INTO

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38. FOLLOWING RWANDA'S INDEPENDENCE IN 1962, THE HUTU GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY BECAME DOMINATED BY SOUTHERNERS. MASSACRES OF HUTUS IN 1972 IN TUTSI-LED BURUNDI HEIGHTENED ETHNIC TENSIONS IN RWANDA, AND IN 1973 MAJOR JUVENAL HABYARIMANA, A NORTHERN HUTU, SEIZED POWER AND ESTABLISHED A ONE-PARTY STATE. DESPITE CLOSE LINKS TO ANTI-TUTSI NORTHERN HUTUS, HABYARIMANA TOOK A FAIRLY MODERATE STAND ON ETHNIC RELATIONS. HE PRESIDED OVER A PERIOD OF RELATIVE SOCIAL PEACE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THOUGH OPPONENTS ACCUSED HIM OF FAVORING THE NORTH AND MURDERING HIS ENEMIES. IN 1990, HABYARIMANA INITIATED REFORMS LEADING TO POLITICAL PLURALISM AND AGREED TO A GRADUAL RETURN OF TUTSI REFUGEES.

39. RPF INVASION. THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) INVADDED FROM UGANDA IN OCTOBER 1990. LED BY TUTSI REFUGEES WHO HAD FLED TO UGANDA AND SERVED WITH PRESIDENT MUSEVENI IN UGANDA'S 1980-86 CIVIL WAR, THE RPF COULD NOT FORCE AN ARMY COLLAPSE OR POPULAR REVOLT. BUT NEITHER COULD HABYARIMANA DEFEAT THE RPF. ENCOURAGED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BY EARLY 1992 HE INCLUDED IN HIS GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY VOCAL POLITICAL OPPONENTS WHO SHARED WITH THE RPF A DESIRE TO LIMIT HIS POWER. THEY TOOK THE LEAD IN NEGOTIATING THE AUGUST 1993 ARUSHA ACCORD, WHERE HABYARIMANA AGREED RELUCTANTLY TO END THE CIVIL WAR BY CEDING SUBSTANTIAL POWER TO THE RPF AND INTERNAL OPPOSITION PARTIES.

40. AS THE RPF AND OTHER PARTIES INCREASED THEIR STRENGTH, NORTHERN HUTUS WITH CLOSE TIES TO HABYARIMANA

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ORGANIZED MILITIAS TO DEFEND THE PRESIDENT AND THEIR PRIVILEGES. THEIR FEARS OF A RETURN OF TUTSI DOMINATION INCREASED AFTER THE OCTOBER 1993 ASSASSINATION OF BURUNDI'S FIRST POPULARLY-ELECTED PRESIDENT, A HUTU, BY

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TUTSI SOLDIERS, AND TENSIONS CONTINUED TO RISE WHEN PARTY MANEUVERINGS IN EARLY 1994 DELAYED INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT CALLED FOR IN THE ARUSHA ACCORD.

41. RWANDA'S COLLAPSE. RWANDA'S HUTU MILITIAS AND SOME ARMY UNITS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, APPEARED TO LEAD THE ORGANIZED MURDERS OF MODERATE HUTU POLITICIANS (THOUGHT TO BE INSUFFICIENTLY ANTI-RPF) AND TUTSIS IN THE FIRST HOURS AFTER HABYARIMANA WAS KILLED IN AN APRIL 6 PLANE CRASH. THE PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TO WIPE OUT ANY RPF ALLY OR POTENTIAL ALLY, AND THUS RAISE THE COSTS AND LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN RPF/TUTSI TAKEOVER. THE KILLINGS INSTEAD STIMULATED THE APRIL 8 RPF INVASION OUT OF ITS NORTHERN ENCLAVE, WHICH, IN TURN, STIMULATED MORE KILLINGS IN SUBSEQUENT DAYS AS HUTUS--INCITED BY MILITIAMEN AND FEARING THAT THE RPF WOULD KILL THEM--MASSACRED TUTSIS. APPARENTLY ENCOURAGED BY NORTHERN HUTUS, THE ANTI-TUTSI KILLING HAS SINCE SPREAD SOUTHWARD INTO AREAS HISTORICALLY CHARACTERIZED BY RELATIVELY PEACEFUL ETHNIC RELATIONS. NO END TO THE UNPRECEDENTED BLOODSHED IS YET IN SIGHT.

42. BURUNDI. IN BURUNDI, BY CONTRAST, TUTSIS HAVE KEPT CONTROL SINCE INDEPENDENCE. AFTER TOPPLING THE MONARCHY IN A 1966 COUP, A SUCCESSION OF TUTSI MILITARY LEADERS HEADED THE GOVERNMENT. THEY PRESIDED OVER THE MASSACRE

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OF PERHAPS 200,000 HUTUS IN 1972 AND 10,000 MORE IN 1988, BUT LATER LAUNCHED REFORMS ALLOWING MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS THAT BROUGHT A HUTU PRESIDENT AND HUTU-MAJORITY PARLIAMENT INTO OFFICE IN JULY 1993. BUT TUTSIS CONTINUED TO DOMINATE THE MILITARY AFTER THE ELECTION--AND SOME STAGED AN OCTOBER 1993 COUP ATTEMPT THAT KILLED THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND SPARKED A CYCLE OF VIOLENCE THAT KILLED 30,000-100,000 HUTUS AND TUTSIS. THE TUTSI MILITARY HAS SINCE DEMONSTRATED THAT IT RETAINS EFFECTIVE VETO POWER OVER BURUNDIAN POLITICS, BUT TUTSI OFFICERS AND HUTU POLITICIANS ARE TRYING TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY GOVERNING ARRANGEMENTS AND AVOID NEW BLOODSHED. (EHRENREICH)

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LESOTHO: COUP IN THE OFFING?

43. THE APRIL 14 HOSTAGE-TAKING IN MASERU WAS CARRIED OUT BY DISAFFECTED ELEMENTS OF THE ROYAL LESOTHO DEFENSE FORCES (RLDF). THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE WAS TO EXTORT A PAY INCREASE FROM THE RULING BASOTHO LAND CONGRESS PARTY (BCP) AND SEEK DISMISSAL OF GOVERNMENT MINISTERS THEY DISLIKED. ALTHOUGH THEY SUBSEQUENTLY THREATENED A COUP IF THE MINISTERS THEY HELD HOSTAGE WERE NOT DISMISSED BY APRIL 24, THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR FOLLOWING THROUGH APPEARS TO BE RECEDING BECAUSE OF A LACK OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. [REDACTED]

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45. HOSTAGE-TAKING. ON APRIL 14, ELEMENTS OF THE LDF IN MASERU STORMED THE HOMES OF FIVE GOVERNMENT MINISTERS. IN THE PROCESS, THEY KILLED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER/FINANCE MINISTER BAHOLO. THE OTHER FOUR MINISTERS WERE TAKEN PRISONER AND SPIRITED AWAY TO AN ARMY BARRACKS NEAR MASERU, WHERE THEY WERE HELD UNTIL THEIR RELEASE LATER IN THE DAY

. ONE OTHER MINISTER, WHO WAS ALSO TARGETED FOR CAPTURE, EVADED THE TROOPS AND TOOK REFUGE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY COMPOUND. THE REBELS, NONE APPARENTLY HIGHER IN RANK THAN SERGEANT, ACCUSED THE OFFICIALS OF OPPOSING THE RLDF AND ITS DEMANDS FOR A 100 PERCENT PAY INCREASE AND OF SUPPORTING INTEGRATION OF THE LESOTHO LIBERATION ARMY (LLA), FORMER BCP INSURGENTS, INTO THE RLDF.

46. PRIME MINISTER MOKHEHLE INITIALLY BELIEVED ON APRIL

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14 THAT A COUP MIGHT BE UNDERWAY. AS THE DAY WORE ON,  
NO LEADER STEPPED FORWARD TO MAKE DEMANDS FOR THE  
RESIGNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO  
CAPTURE THE PRIME MINISTER OR RADIO LESOTHO, AND NO  
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MOVES WERE TAKEN TO SEAL THE BORDERS.

47. COUP THREATS. THE FOUR DETAINED MINISTERS WERE  
RELEASED BY THEIR CAPTORS UNHARMED, LATE APRIL 14,  
FOLLOWING INTERVENTION BY THE RLDF COMMANDER, CHURCH  
LEADERS AND OTHERS. SHORTLY AFTER FREEING THE  
PRISONERS, THE REBELS THREATENED MOKHEHLE, HOWEVER, THAT  
THEY WOULD LAUNCH A COUP IF THE MINISTERS WERE NOT  
DISMISSED. THIS VALIDATED THE GOVERNMENT'S INITIAL  
FEARS THAT THE APRIL 14 EVENTS WERE THE OPENING SALVOS  
IN A COUP ATTEMPT, INTENDED TO COINCIDE WITH SOUTH  
AFRICA'S ELECTIONS, THAT HAD BEEN SET OFF PREMATURELY.  
THE PRIME MINISTER BELIEVED THE PLAN HAD NOT RUN ITS  
COURSE AND, FAR FROM BEING ABANDONED, WOULD BE  
RELAUNCHED ON/OR ABOUT APRIL 26.

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ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICA

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OFFERED--AS IT DID DURING THE ARMY CRISIS EARLIER IN THE  
YEAR--TO PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO A PEACE KEEPING  
MISSION, IT IS NOT WILLING TO SEND IN TROOPS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

IT IS ALSO UNLIKELY PRESIDENT MUGABE WILL SEND TROOPS,  
EVEN IF HE COULD COUNT ON THE HELP OF BOTSWANA, WHICH  
APPEARS WILLING TO COMMIT FORCES IF ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE  
TO A JOINT EFFORT.

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[REDACTED]

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ETHIOPIA: BIRTHPAINS OF DEMOCRACY

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A  
DIVERSE AND FRACTURED COLLECTION OF OPPOSITION GROUPS INCLUDES FORMER ALLIES OF THE EPRDF WHO FEEL HARASSED BY THE REGIME, AND PARTISANS OF THE OLD IDEOLOGICAL AND ETHNIC RULING ORDER WHO HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EPRDF'S ACCESSION AND ARE DETERMINED TO DELEGITIMIZE ITS RULE. ETHIOPIA'S TRANSITION PERIOD, SLATED TO END WHEN ELECTIONS ARE HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF A NEW CONSTITUTION, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN A DOMINANT ONE-PARTY SYSTEM.

56. IT HAS BEEN NEARLY THREE YEARS SINCE THE EPRDF FORCED THE FLIGHT OF MARXIST DICTATOR MENGISTU TO ZIMBABWE IN MAY OF 1991. ALMOST TWO YEARS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE FLAWED JUNE 1992 REGIONAL ELECTION PROCESS DEGENERATED INTO LOW INTENSITY WARFARE BETWEEN THE EPRDF AND THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT (OLF), AFTER THE LATTER DECAMPED ITS ARMED FORCES AND BOYCOTTED THE ELECTIONS.

57. THE EPRDF, WHOSE LEADERSHIP IS TIGRAYAN, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THE REGIME'S RELUCTANCE TO GIVE FREE REIGN  
TO ANY PARTY OR POLITICIAN UNWILLING TO RENOUNCE  
VIOLENCE WAS DEMONSTRATED IN MID-DECEMBER 1993, WHEN THE  
GOVERNMENT ARRESTED SEVEN OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS RETURNING  
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FROM ABROAD, SIX OF WHOM HAD COME TO ATTEND A "PEACE AND  
RECONCILIATION" CONFERENCE IN THE CAPITAL. ALL WERE  
SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED AFTER ISSUING STATEMENTS  
REPUDIATING VIOLENCE.

58. [REDACTED] AS A CONSEQUENCE  
OF EXPULSIONS AND RESIGNATIONS, THE TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
OF REPRESENTATIVES, WHICH CONTAINED 87 MEMBERS IN 1991,  
HAS BEEN REDUCED TO 64 SEATS. THIRTY-TWO ARE HELD BY  
THE EPRDF, AND OF THE REMAINING 32' NO MORE THAN THREE  
BELONG TO ANY SINGLE PARTY. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AS A RESULT,  
THREE PARTIES WITHDREW THEIR REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION IN MID-DECEMBER AND EARLY  
JANUARY, CLAIMING THAT IT WAS PREJUDICED.

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59. NATIONAL ELECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED ON JUNE 5, 1994  
FOR A 547-PERSON CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY CHARGED WITH  
APPROVING A CONSTITUTION DRAFTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL  
COMMISSION. ELECTIONS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE HELD  
UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION. SINCE MAJOR OPPOSITION  
GROUPS, INCLUDING THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT (OLF), ARE  
NOT EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JUNE 5 BALLOTING, THE  
LIKELY RESULT WILL BE AN 'ELECTED' BODY THAT DOES NOT  
ACCURATELY REFLECT THE POLITICAL PREFERENCES OF MANY  
ETHIOPIANS.

60. A FRACTURED OPPOSITION. THERE IS AT PRESENT NO  
VIALE ALTERNATIVE TO THE EPRDF ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL.  
WHILE OPPOSITION GROUPS ARE IN ABUNDANCE -- THERE MAY BE  
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MORE THAN 100 -- MOST PARTIES ARE CONFINED TO NARROW

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ETHNICALLY-BASED REGIONAL CONSTITUENCIES. MOREOVER  
SOME GROUPS ARE COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF SUPPORTERS OF THE  
FORMER REGIME, AND LACK A DEMOCRATIC TRADITION.

61. FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE THE  
OPPOSITION'S RETURN TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS COLLAPSED  
IN LATE MARCH AFTER MELES WOULD ACCEDE TO A  
CARTER-MEDIATED RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE IN ADDIS ABABA  
ONLY IF THE OPPOSITION [REDACTED]  
RENOUNCED VIOLENCE AND AGREED TO WORK WITHIN THE  
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS "AS IT IS CURRENTLY STRUCTURED." THE  
OPPOSITION INSISTS THAT THE EPRDF'S MANDATE, WHICH  
TECHNICALLY ENDED ON JANUARY 22 BUT WAS UNILATERALLY  
EXTENDED UNTIL ELECTIONS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT ARE HELD,  
HAS EXPIRED AND DEMANDS THAT A NEW TRANSITIONAL REGIME  
BE INSTALLED.

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62. THE OROMO FACTOR. THE ONE OPPOSITION ARTY WHICH  
THE EPRDF TAKES SERIOUSLY AND GRUDGINGLY RESPECTS IS THE  
OLF. THIS IS MAINLY BECAUSE THE OLF FOUGHT AGAINST  
MENGISTU, ALBEIT INEFFECTIVELY, AND BECAUSE THE OROMOS  
REPRESENT SOME FORTY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. STILL,  
THE OLF HAS BEEN WEAKENED BY INTERNAL SCHISMS, THE  
ABJECT FAILURE OF ITS MILITARY CHALLENGE TO THE EPRDF,  
AND THE ADDITIONAL HANDICAP OF THE OROMOS' GEOGRAPHICAL  
AND RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS. THOUGH MELES WOULD LIKE TO  
REENGAGE THE OLF POLITICALLY TO BOLSTER REGIME  
CREDIBILITY, HE INSISTS THAT IT FORSWEAR ANY INTENTION  
TO MAINTAIN A MILITIA OR RESORT TO FORCE. THE OLF HAS  
NOT TRUSTED THE EPRDF ENOUGH TO MAKE SU  
CH CONCESSIONS,

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63. THE MAY 1 DEADLINE FOR POLITICAL PARTIES TO  
REGISTER OR FORFEIT THEIR LEGAL STATUS HAS BEEN EXTENDED  
TO LATE MAY BY THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES. THE  
APRIL 6 END DATE FOR CANDIDATE REGISTRATION FOR THE JUNE  
5 ELECTIONS HAS ALREADY PASSED, MEANING THAT ANY GROUP  
WHICH DID NOT REGISTER AS A PARTY BEFORE THEN WILL NOT  
HAVE CANDIDATES FOR, AND CONSEQUENTLY MEMBERS IN, THE

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CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. IT IS THUS NEARLY CERTAIN THAT THE OLF WILL NOT FORMALLY PARTICIPATE IN JUNE, LEAVING THE OROMOS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN CANDIDATES WHO REGISTERED AS INDEPENDENTS -- 62 PERCENT OF ALL CANDIDATES DID SO -- AND SUPPORTERS OF THE EPRDF-AFFILIATED OROMO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION (OPDO).

64. OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS. THE PREDOMINANTLY AMHARIC ALL AMHARA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (AAPO) IS LED BY FORMER ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR ASRAT WOLDES, WHO IS CURRENTLY FACING CHARGES OF ARMED REBELLION. THE AMHARAS, APPROXIMATELY TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, RESENT THEIR LOSS OF POLITICAL POWER AND THE EROSION OF THEIR PREDOMINANCE IN THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY AND ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY. AS [REDACTED] CENTRALISTS, THEY ARE APPALLED BY THE EPRDF'S EMPHASIS ON REGIONALIZATION AND TOLERANCE OF ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE. THE AAPO'S [REDACTED] AMHARIC RHETORIC DISCOURAGES ALLIANCES WITH SMALLER REGIONAL PARTIES THAT

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EQUALLY DISLIKE TIGRAYAN DOMINATION.

65. ANOTHER MOSTLY AMHARIC PARTY IS THE COALITION OF ETHIOPIAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES (COEDF), WHICH DRAWS MANY OF ITS MEMBERS FROM THE RANKS OF FORMER SUPPORTERS OF MENGISTU AND THE RADICAL LEFTIST PARTIES OF THE 1970S. ALTHOUGH IT HAS A BENIGN POLITICAL WING THAT HAS PETITIONED FOR SUPPORT IN WESTERN CAPITALS, IT REPORTEDLY ALSO HAS ARMED CADRES IN UGANDA AND KENYA.

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66. THE NEWEST, AND MOST DEMOCRATICALLY INCLINED, OPPOSITION GROUP IS THE ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ENDP), A COALITION FORMED ON APRIL 2 OF FIVE PARTIES WHICH HAVE A TOTAL OF TEN SEATS IN THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES. ITS LEADERSHIP INCLUDES THE VICE-CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

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COMMISSION. THE ENDP'S PLATFORM OF PRIVATIZATION, O  
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SECESSION, AND MULTI-PARTY  
FEDERALISM IS ATTRACTIVE IN MANY QUARTERS AND SHOULD  
GARNER SUPPORT. ITS MEMBERSHIP ROOTS ARE WEAK, HOWEVER,  
CONFINED PRINCIPALLY TO SMALL, RURAL POPULATIONS IN  
SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA. ALTHOUGH MELES REPORTEDLY WOULD LIKE  
TO SEE THE ENDP PARTICIPATE IN JUNE, THE NEW PARTY  
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MISSED THE DEADLINE TO REGISTER CANDIDATES AND IS  
SCRAMBLING TO MEET THE EXTENDED DEADLINE TO REGISTER AS  
A PARTY.

67. TEN ETHIO-SOMALI PARTIES FORMED A SECESSIONIST  
COALITION IN JANUARY, INCLUDING THE SIGNIFICANT OGADEN  
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ONLF), WHICH HAS LOST GROUND  
RECENTLY TO THE MORE RADICAL MUSLIM AL-ITIHAAD AL-ISLAMI  
ORGANIZATION. IN RESPONSE, THE EPRDF ENGINEERED THE  
CREATION ON FEBRUARY 10 OF THE PRO-UNITY ETHIOPIAN  
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE (ESDL). THE ESDL'S [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] OF OGADENI ELDERS MAY WELL ATTRACT  
SUPPORT FROM VOTERS DISENCHANTED WITH SECESSIONISM IN  
THE AFTERMATH OF SOMALIA'S DESCENT INTO ANARCHY.

B1

68. THE GOVERNMENT'S AGENDA. WHILE THE OPPOSITION MAY  
NOT BE WHOLLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND  
IS FLAWED IN OTHER WAYS, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THERE IS NO  
DEMOCRATIC TRADITION IN ETHIOPIA, WHICH HAS EXPERIENCED  
ONLY IMPERIAL AND DICTATORIAL RULE. NEITHER IS THERE A  
TRADITION OF A FREE PRESS. [REDACTED]

B1

[REDACTED] A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN  
DETAINED AND NEWSBOYS HARASSED. GOVERNMENT BROADCAST  
AND PRINT MEDIA, WHICH INCLUDES THE SOLE TELEVISION  
CHANNEL AND ALL RADIO STATIONS, CONTINUE TO LACK  
INDEPENDENCE [REDACTED] THE OFTEN EGREGIOUS  
SENSATIONALISM OF NON-GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS HAS NOT  
PERSUADED THE EPRDF OF THE VALUE OF AN UNRESTRICTED  
MEDIA.

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69. THOUGH A SEMI-INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE BEEN RELEASED, AT LEAST 2000 DETAINEES MOST OF THEM ALLEGED OLF SUPPORTERS, CONTINUE TO BE HELD WITHOUT CHARGE, MANY FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] PARTIALLY IN RESPONSE TO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND AAPD SENTIMENT WITHIN THE FACULTY, SOME FORTY-TWO, MOSTLY AMHARIC PROFESSORS WERE PURGED FROM ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY LAST YEAR; 38 WERE PLACED ON PROBATION.

70. MELES HAS ALMOST ALWAYS CLAIMED THE HIGH ROAD, EMBRACED DEMOCRACY IN PERSUASIVE TONES, AND PRESENTED PLAUSIBLE EXCUSES FOR CRACKING DOWN ON THE OPPOSITION. HARDER LINE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN LESS REASONABLE IN DEPENDING THE EPRDF'S ACTIONS.

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[REDACTED] WITHOUT A CREDIBLE INTERNAL OPPOSITION, ETHIOPIA IS LIKELY TO HAVE A DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

73. MELES HAS DONE MUCH TO OPEN UP HIS COUNTRY'S POLITICAL PROCESS, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY WHEN COMPARED TO THE FORMER MENGISTU REGIME. HE HAS ALSO BEEN HELPFUL TO THE US IN REGIONAL MATTERS, BOTH BY PROMOTING PEACE IN

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SOMALIA AND SEEKING TO INHIBIT THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC  
FUNDAMENTALISM FROM SUDAN. [REDACTED] HE  
MAY BE THE MOST VIABLE HOPE FOR CONTINUED REFORM OF  
ETHIOPIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM. (BATTS)

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CONGO'S FRAGILE PEACE

74. BRAZZAVILLE HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET SINCE  
JANUARY, WHEN HUNDREDS WERE KILLED IN CLASHES BETWEEN  
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION FORCES CHALLENGING THE OCTOBER  
1993 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RESULTS WHICH GAVE RESIDENT  
LISSOUBA'S COALITION A PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY.  
PARLIAMENT CONTINUED TO DELIBERATE DURING THE FIGHTING  
AND OPPOSITION AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAVE SINCE MADE  
SOME CONCRETE MOVES TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. NOW THAT  
THE OPPOSITION SEEMS TO HAVE RESIGNED ITSELF TO THE  
GOVERNMENT'S RULE, AND THE STREET MILITIAS ARE AT LEAST  
TEMPORARILY SUBDUED, PERHAPS CONGO CAN FINALLY RESUME  
THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS.

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75. ELECTORAL IMPASSE. DESPITE LISSOUBA'S VICTORY IN  
THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND HIS COALITION'S IN  
THE OCTOBER 1993 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, THE OPPOSITION  
HAS CONTINUED TO RESIST HIS RULE AND HAS BEEN TRYING TO  
WREST POWER FROM HIM THROUGH POLITICAL MANEUVERS AND  
DISPUTED LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. LISSOUBA HAS BEEN  
UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE, AND THUS THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE  
PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIZATION. CONTENDING FACTIONS AND  
GOVERNMENT FORCES CLASHED PERIODICALLY FOR THE PAST YEAR  
AND A HALF, PREVENTING THE GOVERNMENT FROM ADDRESSING A  
MYRIAD OF OTHER SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

76. ARBITRATION PANEL VERDICT. AN INTERNATIONAL  
ARBITRATION PANEL, SET UP BY THE LIBREVILLE ACCORD  
SIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES IN  
AUGUST 1993, RULED ON JANUARY 31 THAT DISPUTED  
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN NINE DISTRICTS SHOULD BE  
RE-RUN. THE VERDICT DID NOT THREATEN LISSOUBA'S  
PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY, AND THE OPPOSITION SAID IT WOULD  
RESPECT THE VERDICT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO ANNOUNCE  
A DATE FOR THE NEW ELECTIONS.

77. DEPLOYMENT OF MULTI-ETHNIC PEACEKEEPING FORCE. IN



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AN EFFORT TO END THE FACTONAL FIGHTING IN BRAZZAVILLE WHICH CONTINUED AFTER THE VERDICT, THE GOVERNMENT ON FEBRUARY 25 DEPLOYED A 400-MAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE COMPOSED OF SOLDIERS FROM BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION FORCES INTO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICTS OF BRAZZAVILLE TO COLLECT ILLEGAL ARMS FROM THE RIVAL "MILITIAS". THESE "MILITIAS" INCLUDED THE MOVEMENT FOR INTEGRAL DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT (MCDDI) LEADER KOLELAS' "NINJAS", AD  
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THE "COBRAS," SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT DENIS SASSOU-NGUESSO, LEADER OF THE CONGOLESE LABOR PARTY (PCT). THE "ZULUS", LISSOUBA'S SUPPORTERS, WERE SUPPOSEDLY INCORPORATED INTO THE FORCE.

78. FACTIONAL VIOLENCE. CALM PREVAILED UNTIL APRIL 3, WHEN A SOLDIER WAS KILLED DURING A SHOOTOUT BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES AND THE COBRAS. CLASHES ERUPTED BETWEEN THE NINJAS, ZULUS, AND COBRAS. GOVERNMENT POLICE FORCES WERE ABOUT TO LAUNCH A MAJOR ATTACK ON THE COBRAS TO FORCE THEM OUT OF THE AREA SURROUNDING SASSOU'S

COMPOUND, BUT ON APRIL 14 PERSUADED THEM TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA WITHOUT FURTHER BLOODSHED. THE FRENCH REPORTEDLY MAY BANKROLL ANOTHER MULTI-ETHNIC PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE MPILA DISTRICT. A FRENCH MILITARY TEAM CAME TO BRAZZAVILLE ON APRIL 12 AT LISSOUBA'S REQUEST TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE FRENCH TRAINING OF CONGOLESE POLICEMEN TO DEAL WITH THE "JUVENILE DELINQUENCY" OF THE MILITIAS.

79. DECENTRALIZATION PLAN BLOCKED. COUNTRY-WIDE LOCAL GOVERNING COUNCILS WERE ELECTED IN EARLY 1992 BUT STILL HAVE NOT BEEN SEATED. BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SENATE OVER THE DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER, A JOINT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY/SENATE COMMISSION TO DATE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO WORK OUT A COMPROMISE SOLUTION. ON APRIL 6 HARD-LINE INTERIOR MINISTER MBERI BLOCKED PASSAGE OF THE SENATE'S PROPOSED DECENTRALIZATION LAW. WHICH WOULD HAVE ENABLED KOLELAS AND FELLOW OPPOSITION LEADER JEAN-PIERRE THYSTERE-TCHICAYA TO BECOME MAYORS OF BRAZZAVILLE AND  
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POINTE-NOIRE, RESPECTIVELY. MBERI CLAIMED THE  
GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AFFORD THE ADDITIONAL EXPENSE OF  
SETTING UP LOCAL COUNCILS, AND INSISTED THAT LOCAL  
GOVERNMENTS REMAIN UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE  
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR. THE OPPOSITION WAS ANGERED  
THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS IMPEDING THE FUNCTIONING OF  
LOCAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

80. PARLIAMENTARY PERSEVERANCE. DESPITE THE BLOCKAGE  
OVER THE DECENTRALIZATION ISSUE AND SPORADIC OUTBREAKS  
OF VIOLENCE, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY POSITIVE STEPS TAKEN  
BY THE OPPOSITION AND THE GOVERNMENT. PARLIAMENTARIANS  
IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONTINUED THEIR WORK THROUGHOUT  
THE VIOLENCE, AND WERE STILL TRYING TO WORK OUT A  
COMPROMISE DECENTRALIZATION PLAN BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE  
SESSION ENDED ON APRIL 30. THE GOVERNMENT PURSUED ITS  
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PLAN EVEN THOUGH THE FIGHTING KEPT  
WORLD BANK AND IMF DELEGATIONS FROM VISITING.

81. PEACE TRAIN. A "PEACE TRAIN" CARRYING GOVERNMENT  
AND OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTHERN  
AREAS OF CONGO CARRYING A MESSAGE OF RECONCILIATION  
COMPLETED ITS JOURNEY IN MARCH, AS REGULAR FREIGHT  
SERVICE WHICH HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN SINCE DECEMBER WAS  
RESTORED BETWEEN BRAZZAVILLE AND POINTE-NOIRE. THIS  
EFFORT HAS HELPED REDUCE ECONOMIC TENSIONS AS WELL AS  
LITERALLY AND FIGURATIVELY REUNITING THE COUNTRY.

82. CIVIL SERVICE AND UNIONS. THE GOVERNMENT PAID  
JANUARY'S CIVIL SERVICE SALARIES IN MARCH AND BEGAN  
PAYING FEBRUARY'S SALARIES ON APRIL 23. THE GOVERNMENT  
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BEGAN ALSO TO TRIM THE PAYROLL BY WINNOWING OUT THE  
APPROXIMATELY 8,000 CIVIL SERVANTS WHO WERE IN AN  
"IRREGULAR" STATUS, E.G., THEY WERE GETTING PAID TWICE,  
OR DIDN'T GO TO WORK, OR DID NOT EXIST. THE UNIONS'  
DEMAND FOR A 70 PERCENT INCREASE FOLLOWING THE JANUARY  
CFA DEVALUATION WAS CONSIDERED UNREALISTIC BY GOVERNMENT  
AND OPPOSITION LEADERS, AS WELL AS BY MANY CIVIL  
SERVANTS, AND THEY LACKED THE SUPPORT TO PRESS THEIR  
CASE.

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83. DESIRE FOR PEACE. MOST IMPRESSIVELY, OPPOSITION LEADERS KOLELAS AND SASSOU HAVE SHOWN NO TASTE FOR FURTHER CONFLICT AND A STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE. KOLELAS PUBLICLY CALLED FOR A HALT TO VIOLENCE ON FEBRUARY 22 AND HIS INSISTENCE ON THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF FORMER "AUBEVILLE BOYS" COMMANDER NGUEMBO PROMPTED NGUEMBO TO WANT TO PUBLICLY THANK HIM, BUT HE WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY INTERIOR MINISTER MBERI. SASSOU HAS REMAINED IN DE FACTO EXILE IN HIS HOME VILLAGE. LISSOUBA, HOWEVER, IS STILL SUSPICIOUS OF SASSOU'S INTENTIONS AND HAS REFUSED AN OFFER BY SASSOU'S FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER TO HAVE SENEGALESE PRESIDENT DIOUF'S SERVE AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THEM. IN A PERHAPS CONCILIATORY GESTURE BY THE GOVERNMENT, ARMY TROOPS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE STREETS OF BRAZZAVILLE, BUT THE MULTI-ETHNIC PEACEKEEPING FORCE REMAINS.

84. A TENUOUS HOPE FOR THE FUTURE. THE OPPOSITION MAY WANT PEACE BECAUSE IT REALIZES IT CANNOT BEAT LISSOUBA'S FORCES AND HAS EXPERIENCED THE HAVOC THEY CAN WREAK. AFTER ALMOST TWO YEARS OF DISPUTING LISSOUBA'S CLAIM TO  
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POWER, THE OPPOSITION MAY BE FINALLY READY TO ACCEPT HIS RULE AND WORK WITH RATHER THAN AGAINST HIM. LISSOUBA, FOR HIS PART, NEEDS NOW TO SHOW SOME WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. IF ALL ARTIES CAN HEAL THE WOUNDS OF THE PAST AND CONTROL THE EXCESSES OF THE MILITIAS THAT ARE STILL ON THE STREETS, PERHAPS CONGO CAN CONTINUE ITS SLOW MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY. (WAGONER) CHRISTOPHER

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